Markets with increasing returns resulting from the positive external effects of production (hereafter external increasing returns) have been discussed from both positive and normative points of view. We present a complete general equilibrium model in which external increasing returns prevail within industries to produce differentiated commodities which are represented by real valued functions. Firms in an industry produce the commodity characteristics which are values of each commodity function. This formulation of differentiated commodities causes the equilibrium to be characterized as the solution of a variational problem. In order to answer this mathematically formidable question, we utilize the delta function of Dirac for the calculus of variations to be done in an elementary way. To our knowledge, this is the first time the delta function appears in economic analysis.
Introduction
In this paper, we analyze a market in which there are increasing returns resulting from a positive external effect of production. We present this idea formally, in a mathematically rigorous manner, in the following section. By increasing returns, we mean the increase in each firm's productivity resulting from the investments of all firms in the market. The theory of increasing returns in this sense was initiated by Alfred Marshall [1] with the following rather mysterious descriptions.
We may divide the economies arising from an increase in the scale of production of any kind of goods, into two classes-firstly, those dependent on the general development of the industry; and secondly, those dependent on the resources of the individual houses of business engaged in it, on their organization and the efficiency of their management. We may call the former external economies, and the latter internal economies (op.cit., Ch. IX, p. 221).
This ambiguous "definition" immediately invited furious debate about whether these increasing returns were compatible with the competitive equilibrium [2] - [7] . These discussions further degenerated into confusion. Indeed Chipman [8] reported as follows 1 .
[The compatibility of increasing returns with perfectly competitive equilibrium] was once a lively subject of debate. The debate appears to have petered out in the 1930's, with nobody the apparent winner. That this was the outcome seems evident from later writings of some of the participants. Thus, Sir Dennis Robertson [9] presented in 1957 an account that was substantially unaltered from his contribution to the 1930 Symposium on Increasing Returns, supporting the compatibility of increasing returns with perfect competition. On the other hand, Sir Roy Harrod [10] in 1967 was able to state flatly, without any qualification as to whether economies were internal or external, that "Increasing returns can, of course only occur if competition is less than perfect". In the contemporary international trade literature, some authors maintain that perfect competition can prevail under conditions of increasing returns, provided the economies of scale are external to individual firms; whereas others deny the compatibility of economies of scale with perfect competition under any circumstances, and with equal confidence ... (op.cit., pp. 347-9).
After the concept of "externalities" in the modern sense was established by Edgeworth [11] , the debates were finally terminated by Chipman (op.cit.) who provided a clear definition of external increasing returns, and showed, using the example of a single-consumer economy with Cobb-Douglas utility, that external increasing returns were indeed compatible with the competitive equilibria, and even with Pareto optimality (the welfare formula).
Young (op.cit.) pointed out that this idea could date back to the division of labor in Adam Smith [12] . Young described this as follows:
The division of labor resulting in the increasing returns was limited by the extent of the market, and conversely the extent of the market is in turn enlarged by the division of labor.
Consequently, he wrote: the division of labor depends in large part upon the division of labor, and added that this is more than mere tautology.
Young claimed that increasing returns were the source of economic growth. This 1 For details of these debates and their consequences, see also Chipman (op.cit.). observation was supported by Romer [13] , who interpreted them as a "knowledge spillover". For example, when one firm succeeds in inventing a new technology or innovation, it will not be able to keep it secret or defend it by patent for a long period.
Eventually, the discovery will be revealed to other firms, and consequently the productivity of the entire industry (and eventually the whole economy) will increase.
Romer also insisted that the original idea dates back at least to Adam Smith.
The idea that increasing returns are central to the explanation of long-run growth is at least as old as Adam Smith's story of the pin factory (op.cit., p. 1004).
Why is it that both Young and Romer referred to the division of labor in Smith's pin factory? How does this relate to external increasing returns? The division of labor also increases the productivity of the firm (factory) by dividing tasks and specializing work in the production processes. However, each separate task makes no sense in and of itself. Although each part of the process is conducted by a single worker (or a group of workers), all other parts are interdependent. The division of labor then presupposes cooperative relationships between the workers in the factory. External increasing returns are then simply a generalization of reciprocity within the factory to the entire industry and/or the whole economy. As a result, external increasing returns "expand" the entire economy: they increase productivity and the range of commodities available to consumers, in addition to ensuring the efficiency of allocations. This is the source of economic growth.
In [14] , the single-consumer example in Chipman (op.cit.) was generalized to a multi-consumer model which provides a consistent and reasonable model of a market with external increasing returns. The basic strategy for proving the existence of competitive equilibrium and obtaining the welfare formula for a model with several consumers is to characterize the equilibrium as the solution of a constrained social optimization problem by applying the ingenious idea of Negishi [15] . As external increasing returns arise from the externality, the Pareto optimality of the resulting equilibrium is not obvious. According to the welfare formula (see Theorem 3.3), it is indeed possible that equilibrium is optimal.
The purpose of the present paper is to incorporate differentiated commodities into the model of Suzuki (op.cit.); i.e., product diversity, in the sense of Hotelling [16] , Lancaster [17] , and Rosen [18] , etc. The economic motivation for this mathematical generalization arises directly from the concept of external increasing returns. As already stated, (external) increasing returns are a generalization of the division of labor. The purpose of the latter is then not only to increase productivity but also to produce more varieties of commodities in society as a whole 2 . Therefore, it is appropriate to incorporate differentiated commodities into a market model to represent a (type of) division of labor, rather than to work with models with fixed numbers of finitely many commodities.
The optimal solution in Suzuki (op.cit.) was that of an optimization problem of a finite dimensional space. Incorporating differentiated commodities into the model, however, causes the equilibrium to be characterized as the solution of a variational problem. In order to answer this mathematical question in an infinite dimensional vector space, we utilize the delta function of Dirac [19] for the calculus of variations to be done in an elementary way. To our knowledge, this is the first time the delta function appears in economic analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and define external increasing returns precisely. In Section 3, we present the theorems and proofs. Theorem 3.1 (the equilibrium formula) asserts that there exists a competitive equilibrium incorporating external increasing returns by constructing the equilibrium explicitly. This shows that the market is consistent with increasing returns.
Similarly, we compute the Pareto optimal allocations (the welfare formula, Theorem 3.2). This formula enables us to compare the equilibrium and optimal allocations (Theorem 3.3). Thanks to the delta function, we do not require any mathematics beyond the level of elementary calculus to obtain the formula. In Section 4, we provide some remarks.
Economy with External Increasing Returns

A Market Model
There exist two categories of the commodities, the homogeneous input commodity The economic interpretation of the differentiated commodities is as follows. When two values t T ∈ and s T ∈ are "close" (in the usual mathematical sense), so are the commodity characteristics t and s (in the economic sense). In other words, the characteristics t and s are not exactly the same, but very similar. When each characteristic contained in two commodity bundles with the same set of the characteristics are close, they are similar, or the commodities are "differentiated". Notice that this interpretation is impossible for the usual finite-dimensional commodity bundles for which the coordinates are necessarily discrete.
Each commodity characteristic t T ∈ is assumed to be produced from the input commodity 0 by a firm that is also indexed by t for convenience (hence, there exist a continuum of firms in the economy) using the production function that embodies the increasing returns, We have to specify the range of the externality to extend. For simplicity, consider a finite number of (measurable
s t s T t s t T s T
We set It is important to distinguish the commodity vectors (bundles) from their characteristics. The industry j produces and supplies its own commodity bundles (hence there exist n distinct commodities in the economy) which are functions ( ) 
Chipman, Romer and Suzuki assumes the function t f to be homogeneous of degree
and it is monotonically increasing in t
Then, by these two conditions, the final output ( ) y t is produced under "increasing returns to scale"; namely,
As t ζ is a parameter for the firm t , the condition (Hom) implies that firm t operates subjectively under constant returns; hence, there exist no problems involved with the "internal increasing returns (convex production functions) 5 ." Furthermore,
∈ , the condition (Mon) means that the more inputs in the industry j , the more productive the technology of each firm becomes. This is the source of the "increasing returns for a whole industry", and we can interpret it to be a kind of reciprocity that is naturally incorporated into the markets. "Naturally incorporated into the market" means that the value of the parameter t ζ is determined endogenously, not given or postulated from outside of the market.
There exists m consumers indexed by ( )
A measurable set is a set for which its (Lebesgue) measure is well defined. Hence the integral
∫ is also well defined for any integrable function ( )
In order to facilitate this point, we have to treat the commodity bundles as the equivalent classes of functions modulo null sets on T . Then ( )
is equivalent with the commodity 0, the constant 0 function. 5 For the theoretical problems arising from convex (not concave!) production functions, see Scarf [20] and Oddou [21] . Arrow [22] discussed the possibility that a kind of increasing returns exists in a more specific model. consumer i 's utility function takes the log-linear (Cobb-Douglas) form, functional that is a map assigning a real value to the function ( )
It is well known and can be verified easily that for log-linear utility functions, all of the standard assumptions such as continuity (in an appropriate sense 6 ), (strong) concavity and monotonicity (the more consumption, the higher utility) and so on are satisfied. Note that i u does not include commodity 0 consumption. Hence, the consumers do not demand commodity 0; rather, they supply it inelastically for as long as they own it. Chipman (op.cit.) observed that this assumption makes formulae very clean without losing essence of discussion. We will then follow him.
We assume that consumer i is endowed with 
The economic meanings of these conditions are clear and do not require detailed explanations, apart from the production externality. Condition (E-1) is the utility maximization condition (under the budget constraint) and condition (E-2) is the profit maximization condition. As the firms perceive themselves that they operate under constant returns to scale, they earn zero profit in the equilibrium. The first condition of (E-3) states that the total amount of the characteristic t which is consumed is equal to what is produced. Recall that the second variable (parameter) of the production function is the total input used within each industry j T . These inputs sum to the total input of the whole economy
, and the latter is equal to the total endowment of the economy (the resource is not wasted). This is consistent with the first condition of (E-3), which states that supply equals demand in the input commodity market.
An important remark on the concept of prices in this economy should be in order. 6 We have to specify a topology on the space of functions ( ) x t to make the meaning of ``continuity'' mathematically rigorous. We set aside of this problem here, because we do not discuss topologies in the present paper. For a precise discussion, see [23] .
Strictly speaking, given the price function ( ) 
as a final output at the price p and "buying" infinitely many characteristics ( ) x t ∈  as inputs at the prices ( ) p t .
Our formulation of the differentiated commodities forces us to present the set of firms producing commodity characteristics as a continuum T . On the contrary, the set of consumers is a finite set { } 1 m  . Therefore one might say that the latter should also be a continuum. We answer this conceptual question by noticing that our model can include a continuum of consumers, following the well known idea (e.g., [24] ). Let [ ] 0,1 I = be the set of consumers which is the unit interval. Define the sets ( )
We define the consumption sector of the economy as a "simple map" The next example, although economically simple, illustrates the mathematical structure of the problem and a technical devise called the delta function for elucidating it will be introduced.
A Simple Example
There exists one consumer 1 m = with the utility function 
This is a fundamental mathematical formula that will be used throughout the paper.
Then we can differentiate 
The above calculation of equilibrium for the one-consumer economy is straightforward. Our economic problem is to compute the competitive equilibrium for the multiconsumer economy. This will be achieved in the next section, using the method of Negishi (op.cit.). where ( ) p t and w are the multipliers (a fortiori they will be the equilibrium prices). 
Existence and Efficiency of the Equilibrium
The Competitive Equilibrium
where 
Suppose that there exists a fixed point
We will show that the saddle point ( ) We don't have to prove the existence, since we will compute it explicitly in the following; see Theorem 3.1.
contradicting the first inequality of (3.2).
Since α is a fixed point, it follows from the definition (3.4) that
and from this we obtain that
The conditions ˆ0 i α > , (3.6) and (E-3) imply that the right-hand side of equation 
, hence the equilibrium condition (E-1) is met. Similarly the equilibrium condition (E-2) follows from (3.2) and (3.6).
Integrating (3.5) and using the budget constraint, we have ˆˆ, 1 . 
.
Therefore, we have proved Theorem 3.1 (Equilibrium Formula) The competitive equilibrium ( )
, , t i z x t w p t uniquely exists and is given by (3.10) , (3.11) , (3.12) and (3.13) .
The Welfare Formula
In this section, we consider the social optimization problem 
, , 1 .
Remember that the solution is unique. their prices to attract more customers and consequently to earn more profits. In this model, it is possible to interpret the commodity to be differentiated according to the coordinate of the real line (the location of the consumers), t ∈  .
Our formulation of commodity differentiation, however, follows Lancaster (op.cit.)
and Rosen (op.cit.). According to them, consumers are assumed to obtain their utility not directly from the commodity itself, but from the commodity's characteristics exactly as in this paper. They assumed that there exist two (indexes of) characteristics and that the space of the commodity characteristics is a compact subset of T of 2  . In particular, in the Rosen model, every characteristic t T ∈ has its own "price" ( ) We agree that the measures are conceptually more appropriate than the functions.
However, there are mathematically formidable complications in the commodity space of the measures, and the paper of Mas-Colell is very difficult to digest. Jones (op.cit.)
simplified Mas-Colell's proof considerably. Khan-Suzuki [27] further elaborated these works.
Relation with Monopolistic Competition
The competitive equilibrium presented in this paper can be interpreted as a monopolistically competitive equilibrium in the long run. For simplicity, consider the one consumer economy of the example in Section 2.2.
If the firm t behaves monopolistically, it does not take the price ( ) 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered a theoretical model in which the external increasing returns increase the productivity of firms that produce products which are the characteristics of differentiated commodities. We have demonstrated that such a market model is compatible with competitive equilibrium, and even with Pareto optimality.
The external increasing returns are essentially a type of positive externality that works outside markets through the background institutions of societies. Romer's "knowledge spillover effect" is an example of a positive externality. We can also include educational systems, as workers' skills gained through education contribute significantly to a firm's productivity. These institutions organize participants' activities, integrating them such that they can contribute to the whole economy (and society). When the institutions work well, society behaves reciprocally and is well ordered. Adam Smith recognized reciprocity occurring within the division of labor in pin factories and placed these observations at the start of his book, suggesting its importance; his true motive was not to promote unrestricted laissez-faire.
Neoclassical economic theory has emphasized the efficiency of markets, realized through the price mechanism. It has been inclined to shun externalities as a cause of market failures. The presence of external increasing returns, however, supports an opposing view that highlights the significance of background institutions. We must bear in mind that economies do not simply work through market mechanisms; they must be supported by various institutions, both social and political. Unlimited laissezfaire is not appropriate, so it is essential to establish effective institutions that facilitate reciprocity in societies.
Finally, we point out some open questions that remain unanswered in regard to our model. The first issue is our restriction of utility functions in order to compute exact formulae. Obviously, proving the existence of equilibria in a general setting is the first task for pure theorists. Moreover, we may ask if we can obtain any general results concerning optimality. The welfare formulae seem to suggest that the optimal states are "on a knife edge" and are attained "by accident." If so, can this be stated more precisely?
In other words, can the "size" of the optimal states in an appropriate parameter space be estimated? The second issue is the incompleteness of our formulation for the production process of differentiated commodity bundles as final outputs. As stated above, the theoretical status of industry j was "fictitious," and thus a precise and complete description of it is strongly desired in future work.
